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Case No. 20090920-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ALLEN SMITH LLOYD, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant, Allen Smith Lloyd, appeals from his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2007). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the search of Defendant's vehicle violate the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of fact and law. The court's factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. Its legal 
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its 
application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 11,103 
P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Const art I, § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
U.S. Const amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Lloyd was charged by Information with (1) possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony; (2) possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony; and (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. R.l-2, 24-25. Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate 
bound him over for trial in district court. R.27-28. Lloyd moved to suppress the 
evidence seized from his automobile and person, arguing that it was obtained in 
violation of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
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Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. R.29-48. After an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court denied the motion. R. 145-46. 
Pursuant to a subsequent plea agreement, Lloyd entered a conditional 
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and the 
State dismissed the remaining charges. R.148-57. Lloyd reserved his right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. R.151,156. The 
district court sentenced Lloyd to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five 
years, suspended the same, and placed Lloyd on supervised probation for 36 
months. R.162-64. Lloyd timely appealed. R.166-67. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
At 9:19 p.m. on March 8,2008, Ogden City police received a report from a 
city resident that three occupants of a small, green vehicle parked behind her 
residence were smoking drugs. R.178:6-7,22,31. When Officers Powers and 
Harris arrived on the scene, they found the vehicle as described parked behind 
the residence. R.178: 7-8,31-32. As they approached the car, the two officers 
smelled the odor of a burning narcotic emanating from the vehicle, which 
Officer Powers "distinguished to be crack cocaine/' R.178: 9-12,22-24,35; 
The facts are taken from testimony at both the preliminary hearing and 
suppression hearing. 
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R.179:28-29,31,34-35,43.2 Upon reaching the car, Officer Powers contacted 
Lloyd, who was sitting in the driver's seat, and Officer Harris dealt with the two 
female passengers. See R.178: 9,23,32,37. 
Officer Powers asked Lloyd whether he had any weapons or drugs in the 
car. R.178:12. Lloyd said he had a gun under his seat and began to reach for it, 
asking the officer if he wanted him to retrieve it. R.178:12,15,24. Officer Powers 
told Lloyd not to get the gun, asked him to exit the vehicle, and handcuffed him. 
R.178:15. Officer Powers then retrieved a black bag from underneath the seat 
and placed it on the roof of the car. R.178:12-13,25-27. Officer Powers opened 
the bag and found a handgun and a hard, brown eyeglass case containing two 
dirty syringes. R.178:13,27.3 
Officer Powers asked Lloyd whether he had a medical condition requiring 
the use of the syringes. R.178: 14. When Lloyd responded that he did not, 
Officer Powers informed him that he was under arrest R.178:15-16, 20-21,28. 
In a search of Lloyd's person incident to arrest, Officer Powers found a small 
baggie of methamphetamine and a baggie of clean syringes. R.178:16-17. 
2
 Although Officer Harris did not notice anything else, Officer Powers 
testified that he observed that the car was a little "smoky" inside. R.178: 35. 
3
 The handgun was a .45 caliber M1911 pistol, with a fully loaded 
magazine but nothing in the firing chamber. R.178:13-14. 
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Meanwhile, Officer Harris arrested the front seat passenger on several 
outstanding warrants. R.178: 32-33. She searched the passenger and found a 
crack cocaine rock and a crack pipe with a piece of crack in the brindle. R.178: 
33-34; R.179: 38. The pipe appeared to have been recently used, with "fresh 
burn markings" or "a smoky film" on it. R.178:17-20,29-30,34. Officers also 
thwarted the second passenger's attempt to swallow some drugs. See R.178:37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lloyd contends that his detention and the search of his car violated both 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Although he argues that Section 14 should generally 
be interpreted as providing broader protections than the Fourth Amendment, he 
treats the provisions' requirements as one and the same, offering no separate 
state constitutional analysis. This Court, therefore, should only address his 
Fourth Amendment claims. 
Lloyd argues that his detention was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. He contends that the citizen report should be given little weight, 
asserting that it was from an anonymous complainant. To the contrary, the 
complainant identified herself—her report is thus presumed reliable. Lloyd also 
asks the Court to disregard the officers' testimony regarding their detection of 
the odor of a burning narcotic because it contravened his expert's testimony that 
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cocaine has no smell This argument fails for two reasons. First, he overstates 
the import of his expert's testimony, whose experience with burning cocaine 
was limited and who acknowledged that crack cocaine may give off a distinct 
smell from substances with which it is mixed. Second, Lloyd inappropriately 
discounts the experience of the officers. Both officers discerned an odor of 
burning narcotic that they recognized based on their experience with drug 
users. The citizen's report, combined with the officers' detection of a burning 
narcotic, was more than sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity justifying an investigatory detention. 
The officer's seizure of the handgun from underneath Lloyd's car seat was 
likewise justified. The law is well settled that an officer may search a vehicle for 
weapons if there exists a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle may 
contain a weapon that could be obtained by the suspect In this case, Lloyd 
admitted to having a gun under his seat and started to reach for it. These facts 
created a reasonable suspicion justifying the officer's seizure of the weapon. 
Lloyd has asserted that his arrest before the search exceeded the permissible 
scope of an automobile search for weapons. Lloyd, however, was not under 
arrest. To the extent that Lloyd argues his handcuffing was a de facto arrest, the 
argument is inadequately briefed. In any event, the handcuffing was reasonable 
under the circumstances and did not convert the stop to an arrest. 
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Finally, the search of the eyeglass case was likewise justified. Because a 
small weapon could be concealed inside an eyeglass case, the opening of the 
case did not exceed the proper scope of a weapons search. In any event, the 
citizen report, combined with the detection of the odor of burning narcotic, was 
sufficient to establish probable cause. Accordingly, a search for evidence was 
justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
Lloyd argues that he was stopped and searched "in violation of Article I 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States." Aplt. Brf. at 9-10. Specifically, he claims that: 
(1) Officer Powers "did not have reasonable suspicion" to justify the stop, Aplt. 
Brf. at 10,27-28, and (2) Officer Powers "exceeded the permissible bounds of a 
Terry search by placing [him] under arrest for possession of a legal firearm" and 
"by opening [the] small brown glasses case which obviously could not have 
contained a weapon." Aplt. Brf. at 28. These claims lack merit. 
I. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANTS 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM, BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
HAS NOT OFFERED A SEPARATE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
Lloyd devotes much of his brief to the claim that Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution should generally be construed as providing greater 
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protections than those recognized under the Fourth Amendment. See Aplt. Brf. 
at 10-27. He contends that such an interpretation is supported by "the history of 
the Utah Constitution/' Aplt. Brf. at 18-20,27, prior Utah case law, Aplt. Brf. at 
21-22, 25-26, a "'recurrence to fundamental principles/" Aplt. Brf. at 22-23 
(quoting Utah Const, art. I, § 27), and an interest in "'establishing a more 
workable rule for police and trial courts than exists under confusing federal case 
law/" Aplt. Brf. at 26-27 (quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 
1985)). 
Whatever the merits of Lloyd's claim as a general matter, he has "no[t] 
offered any explanation of how the court's analysis under the state constitution 
[in this case] would differ from its consideration under the federal constitution." 
State v. VanDyke, 2009 UT App 369, % 17 n.4,223 P.3d 465, cert, denied, 230 P.3d 
127 (Utah 2010). Lloyd argues that "the stop [violated] Article 1 Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment" because Officer 
Powers "did not have reasonable suspicion that [he] had committed any type of 
crime." Aplt Brf. at 10,27-28. He also argues that Officer Powers "exceeded the 
permissible bounds of a Terry search by" both "placing [him] under arrest" and 
"opening [the] small brown glasses case." Aplt. Brf. at 28. Lloyd thus does not 
suggest that Section 14 requires that a stop be justified on more than reasonable 
suspicion, nor does he suggest that the test for a weapons search is different 
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than that articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). He treats the standards 
as one and the same. 
"'[Tjhere is no magic formula for an adequate state constitutional 
analysis/ " State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ^ 12,173 P.3d 213 (quoting State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 18,164 P.3d 397). Nonetheless, "the analysis for state 
and federal constitutional claims must be 'distinct' and 'separate' or otherwise 
'suggest[] that the two constitutional protections are anything but 
coextensive/" Id. (quoting Worwood, 2007 UT 47,118). Lloyd has failed to do 
so here. "In the absence of a separate and distinct argument under the Utah 
Constitution," this Court should "consider [Lloyd's] claims only under the 
Federal Constitution." Id.4 
The State maintains that Utah courts should employ a rebuttable 
presumption that the protections afforded under Section 14 mirror those of the 
Fourth Amendment. "The inspiration behind the declaration of rights came 
from the great parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country." 2 
Official Report oftlte Proceedings and Debates oftlie Convention 1847 (Salt Lake City, 
Star Printing Co. 1898) (hereinafter "Official Report"). The Bill of Rights thus 
represented the foundation, or starting point, upon which Utah's Declaration of 
Rights was built. Unlike many other provisions in the Declaration of Rights, 
Section 14 was left substantially unaltered from its federal counterpart, the 
Fourth Amendment. Utah courts should presume that the framers' intended to 
"adherfe] to the Constitution of the United States when [they] cop[ied] it." 1 
Official Report 326 (Delegate Eichnor referring to anti-slavery text in Section 22). 
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II. 
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT AND SEARCH OF HIS CAR 
WERE REASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The trial court concluded that the encounter between the Ogden City 
police officers and Lloyd "started out as a Level One" consensual exchange, 
"but it very quickly became a Level Two [investigatory] stop." R.180:28. The 
court concluded that the officers7 detection of the odor of narcotics was 
sufficient to justify the level two investigation. R.180:28-29. It also concluded 
that those facts were sufficient to render "the search [of the automobile] 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." R.180:29. This Court should affirm. 
A, The officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before 
they made contact with Defendant. 
The trial court did not specify when the encounter escalated to a 
detention. Lloyd argues that it escalated "immediately" after the officers 
approached the car and made contact with him. See Aplt. Brf. at 27-28. But in 
their initial encounter with Lloyd—who was already parked —the officers did 
nothing more than converse with him and ask some questions. See R.178:12,23. 
The law is well settled that "a seizure does not occur simply because a police 
officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions." Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). Therefore, Lloyd was seized under the Fourth 
Amendment only after he was ordered to exit his car. See id. (holding that 
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seizure occurs once "police convey a message that compliance with their request 
is required").5 
* * * 
In any event, this Court may assume, without deciding, that Lloyd was 
detained once the officers reached his car and made contact with him. This is so 
because by that point, the officers not only had reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, but also probable cause of such activity. 
An officer may detain an individual for investigative questioning, without 
consent, when the officer "has a 'particularized and objective7 basis for 
suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002). 
Although officers may not rely on a mere hunch, they are permitted "to draw on 
their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and 
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well 
elude an untrained person/ " Id. at 273 (citations omitted). The stop is justified 
so long as there exists "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts," support a reasonable suspicion that 
"criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968). 
5
 Officer Powers did testify that he believed Lloyd was detained when the 
officer "approachjed] the car and . . . started to talk with Mr. Lloyd." R.178: 24. 
However, because nothing in the record suggests that Officer Powers 
communicated that belief to Lloyd, his "subjective view of the nature of the stop 
is not pertinent to [the Court's] analysis." State v. Teliero, 2006 UT App 419, ^ 10 
n.2,147P.3d506. 
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The officers in this case were acting, first, on a citizen report that the 
vehicle occupants were "smoking drugs." 11.178:9,31. That report was sufficient 
in itself to justify an investigatory detention. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
234 (1983) (holding that "if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward 
with a report of criminal activity... rigorous scrutiny of the basis of knowledge 
is unnecessary"). 
Lloyd claims, however, that the citizen complainant was "anonymous" 
and that her report was thus insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 27,32. According to Lloyd, such a report "would suggest that [the 
citizen] had no idea whether the individuals were smoking illegal drugs or 
totally legal tobacco." Aplt. Brf. at 27. Lloyd's argument fails at the outset 
because the complainant was not anonymous. She identified herself when she 
made the call to police (Stacy) and also made known that she was a resident of 
the home behind which Lloyd and his companions were smoking. See R.178: 
7,31. As recently reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court, "an identified citizen-
informant is presumed reliable." State v. Roybal, 2010 UT 34, If 19,232 P.3d 1016; 
accord Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231,235-36 (Utah App. 1997), abrogated 
on other grounds by State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,104 P.3d 1265. 
Moreover, just as the average person can readily identify an individual 
who is drunk, see Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237, the average person can likewise 
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distinguish between someone who is smoking tobacco and someone who is 
smoking illicit drugs like cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin, which are 
typically smoked with a glass pipe or bong. Although the difference between a 
marijuana cigarette and a tobacco cigarette may not be as readily apparent, see 
Ex parte Kelley, 870 So.2d 711,720-21 (Ala. 2003), the average citizen is not likely 
to report illegal drug usage on a hunch or whim. This is especially so where 
"the event was observed first-hand," Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, and where the 
complainant exposed herself to criminal liability if the report was fabricated, see 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36. Accordingly, the citizen report of drug use 
provided "a 'particularized and objective' basis for suspecting legal 
wrongdoing" and justified a Teiry stop. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. 
This Court, however, need not decide whether the report was sufficient in 
itself to justify a Terry stop, because the officers had substantially corroborated 
the report before they ever contacted Lloyd. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-46 
(finding probable cause where police corroborated details of anonymous note 
predicting suspects' travel itinerary). Some ten feet before the officers reached 
the car to question Lloyd, they smelled the odor of a burning narcotic. See 
R.179:28-29. Officer Harris could "[]not pinpoint the exact narcotic/' but 
explained that it was "a smell she recognizefd] from multiple calls . . . where 
various narcotics have been located that [she] ha[d] smelled that smell." 
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R.179:29. Officer Powers likewise smelled the burning odor of illegal drugs, and 
specifically "distinguished [it] to be [burning] crack cocaine." R.178:9-10. 
Lloyd argues that Officer Powers' assertion that he smelled the odor of 
burning cocaine cannot be considered because it "is in direct contravention of all 
drug experts, including [his] expert, James Gaskill, who opine[d] that [cocaine] 
. . . has no smell." Aplt. Brf. at 30.6 He contends that where Officer Powers was 
not a drug recognition expert and the State did not call any other expert, Dr. 
Gaskill's testimony was "unrebutted" and must be accepted by the Court. Aplt. 
Brf. at 30-31. Lloyd's argument fails for two reasons. First, he overstates the 
import of Dr. Gaskill's testimony, and second, he improperly disregards the 
factual assessments of Officers Powers and Harris based on their experience. 
Although Dr. Gaskill testified that cocaine itself "[d]oesn't have any 
particular kind of smell that you can identify," his experience stemmed largely 
from handling pure cocaine powder retained by the lab. See R.179:7-9. 
Moreover, he had only heated cocaine or crack to the point of vaporization "a 
number of times." See R.179:11,14. Even then, the cocaine was heated on a 
watch glass in the lab rather than in a pipe, and he admitted that the fumes did 
"[n]ot [rise] significantly into [his] face." R.179:15. And perhaps most 
6
 Lloyd's claim that "all drug experts" contravene Officer Powers' 
testimony is without any evidentiary support in the record. 
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significantly, Dr. Gaskill acknowledged that cocaine is often mixed with any 
number of other substances that may give off an odor. R.179:16-17,21. In fact, 
Gaskill admitted that he had "from time to time detected an odor which was 
from something other than cocaine in the mixture of cocaine/7 R.179:16. Finally, 
Dr. Gaskill acknowledged that police officers "may smell something on a 
regular basis." R.179:17. "[A]s a scientist," however, he could not conclude that 
it was "definitive enough or regular enough to say [it] is cocaine." R.179:17.7 
In contrast to Dr. Gaskill7 s experience in the lab, Officer Powers7 regularly 
dealt with drug use on the street. Although he had only been a patrol officer for 
one and one-half years, he worked with the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force, participated in drug interdiction activities, and dealt with drug users 
"almost on a daily basis." R.178:6; R.179:33-34. He testified that the odor which 
he smelled when he approached Lloyd's car was the same odor that he had 
smelled on other occasions where police ultimately discovered crack cocaine—at 
parks, in hotel rooms and automobiles, and on individuals. R.179:36-40. 
7
 Moreover, "[cjrack is produced by dissolving powdered cocaine in a 
mixture of water and ammonia or sodium bicarbonate (baking soda)." Crack 
Cocaine Fast Facts, Nat7l Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, 
located at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs3/3978/3978p.pdf. This might 
explain why Officer Powers believed crack cocaine smelled like cat urine, which 
would have an ammonia smell. See R.178:11; R.17952 (Gaskill testifying that 
cat urine might have an ammonia smell, which meth is sometimes said to have). 
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Officer Harris similarly testified that she smelled the distinct odor of a 
burning "narcotic" as she approached the car, though unlike Officer Powers, she 
could not identify the precise narcotic. R.178:35; R.179:28-29,31. Nevertheless, 
just as Officer Powers testified that he had detected the odor only in drug-
related situations, Officer Harris testified that she had smelled that particular 
odor only in those circumstances where police had subsequently discovered 
illegal narcotics. See R.179:29-30. In short, both officers recognized the odor 
coming from Lloyd's car as that of a burning narcotic, substantially 
corroborating the citizen complainant's report of drug use. 
Lloyd contends that the officers' testimony should be disregarded because 
they were not drug recognition experts, or "DREs," and had not received any 
formal training on recognizing the smell of drugs. Aplt. Brf. at 30-31. But 
whether or not they were DREs is irrelevant, because DREs are not trained in 
identifying drugs, but in "detecting] and apprehend[ing] drug impaired 
drivers." See Programs - Drug Recognition Expert, Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 
located at http://publicsafety.utah.gov/highwaypatrol/programs/dre.html 
(emphasis added). And while formal training may qualify one to give 
testimony based on specialized knowledge, so too can experience. See State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, % 36,147 P.3d 1176 (concluding that officer's testimony 
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"was based on specialized knowledge that was acquired through extensive 
training and years of experience with the drug trade"). 
The district court thus correctly considered the officers' testimony that 
"they smelled the smell that was present, narcotics." R.180:29. Officer Harris 
had testified that in "no other common day-to-day setting ha[d] [she] ever 
smelled that chemical odor except when it's associated with narcotic use." 
R.180:29. Officer Powers similarly testified. See R.179:36-40. The district court 
thus ruled that the officers' testimony constituted "objective evidence that 
allows an officer to make a rational inference . . . that narcotics are present." 
R.180:29. Contrary to Lloyd's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 30-32, the court's ruling was 
consistent with well settled law that in the "objective analysis," reviewing courts 
must give "due weight" to an officer's "evaluation of the circumstances" based 
on his or her experience. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f f 20-21, 78 P.3d 590; 
accord Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. Indeed, this is the very kind of evidence that 
" 'might well elude an untrained [or inexperienced] person/ " Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 
273 (citation omitted). 
* * * 
In sum, the citizen report that the vehicle occupants were smoking drugs, 
combined with the odor of a burning narcotic detected by the two officers, not 
only established "a 'particularized and objective' basis for suspecting" illegal 
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drug use, Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, but established "a probability or substantial 
chance" of illegal drug use, Gates, 462 U.S. at 235. Indeed, these facts " 'would 
[have] justif [ied] the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant [was] not 
actually obtained.'" Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,467 (1999) (quoting United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)). A Terry stop, therefore, was more than 
justified. 
B. The weapon search of Defendant's car was supported by 
reasonable suspicion. 
Officer Powers7 search and seizure of the handgun underneath the 
driver's seat was also justified. As with other Terry stops, "officers may conduct 
a pat-down search of the driver and other vehicle occupants 'upon reasonable 
suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous/ " State v. Baker, 2010 UT18, f 
26,229 P.3d 650 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, - U.S. - , 129 S.Ct. 781,787 (2009)). 
Such reasonable suspicion also justifies a "search of the passenger compartment 
of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or 
hidden." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1049-50 (1983). When asked whether 
he had any drugs or weapons in the car, Lloyd "said yes, there's a gun under 
my seat." R.178:12. Asking the officer if he wanted him to retrieve it, Lloyd 
then "started to reach for it." R.178:15. These facts were more than sufficient to 
support a reasonable belief that Lloyd was armed and "may gain immediate 
control of weapons." Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. 
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On appeal, Lloyd argues that Officer Powers "had less cause for alarm" 
than did the officer who conducted a vehicle search for weapons in State v. 
Parke, 2009 UT 50,205 P.3d 104, cert denied, 215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009), where this 
Court found reasonable suspicion lacking. But the facts in this case are nothing 
like those in Parke. After being stopped in a high crime area for a traffic offense, 
Parke made an ambiguous "shoulder movement" and became "somewhat 
agitated" when the officer ordered him to place his hands outside the window. 
Id. at ^ 2,8. Parke ultimately complied with the officer's order and then exited 
the vehicle on the officer's request. Id. at ^ 13,16-17. 
Parke was thus suspected of only a minor traffic offense, his gesture was 
ambiguous, and the presence of a weapon was never confirmed. In contrast, 
Lloyd was suspected of using cocaine or some other narcotic, he personally 
confirmed that he had a gun under the seat, and he made an unambiguous 
move toward the gun. These facts were more than sufficient to support a 
reasonable suspicion that Lloyd was armed and dangerous and might gain 
access to the gun. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (holding that an automobile search 
for weapons need only be supported by a "reasonable belief"). 
Indeed, the possibility that Lloyd was armed and dangerous was more 
certain than the possibility that the suspects in Terry were armed and 
dangerous. While on afternoon patrol, the officer in Terry observed two men 
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repeatedly walk back and forth on a sidewalk, each time pausing to look into the 
same store window, and then confer with each other, and on one occasion, with 
a third man. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7,22-23. The Supreme Court found that the 
officer's detention and subsequent frisk of the men was reasonable. Id. at 22-23, 
30-31. In this case, Officer Powers knew Lloyd had a gun and Lloyd began to 
reach for it. He also had a substantial basis to believe that Lloyd had been 
smoking cocaine or some other narcotic and thus had reason to believe that 
Lloyd's "judgment might have been impaired and his inhibitions reduced/' 
United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1014 
(1993). Certainly, if the weapons search in Terry was reasonable, the search in 
this case was also reasonable. 
Lloyd argues, however, that Officer Powers "exceeded the permissible 
bounds of a Terry search by placing [him] under arrest for possession of a legal 
firearm, which became illegal only upon the discovery that [he] was engaged in 
the possession, use, or distribution of drugs." Aplt. Brf. at 28. This claim fails 
because Officer Powers testified that he did not place Lloyd under arrest on any 
charge until after the handgun and two dirty syringes were seized and Lloyd 
confirmed that he had no medical condition requiring the use of syringes. See 
R.178:28. To the extent Lloyd claims that the handcuffing constituted a de facto 
arrest and exceeded the permissible scope of a Teny frisk, his argument is 
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inadequately briefed. Indeed, Lloyd has cited to no case, and has engaged in no 
legal analysis, supporting such a claim. See Aplt. Brf. at 28. This Court should 
thus decline to address it. See State v. Sliepterd, 1999 UT App 305, f 27,989 P.2d 
503 (declining to consider merits where defendant "fail[ed] to cite relevant legal 
authority or provide any meaningful analysis on the issue"). 
In any event, Utah courts have generally recognized that officers may take 
reasonable measures, such as the use of handcuffs, when "necessary to insure 
their safety." State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) (holding that 
handcuffing reasonable during execution of search warrant); State v. Marquez, 
2007 UT App 170, \ 13,163 P.3d 687 (holding that "it was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment for [officer] to frisk [defendant] after placing him in 
handcuffs" because "handcuffing... did not entirely eliminate the risk of harm 
to the officers"). Moreover, other courts that have addressed the issue have 
generally recognized that under appropriate circumstances, "handcuffing [may 
be] an appropriate method of maintaining the status quo" during a Terry stop. 
Sanders, 994 F.2d at 206; accord United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 696 (4th Cir. 
2010) (holding that "an officer's use of a drawn weapon and/or handcuffs does 
not necessarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest"); United States v. Albert, 579 
F.3d 1188,1195 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that "use of handcuffs was reasonable 
under the[ ] circumstances, coming as it did after the discovery of a controlled 
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substance (and with the knowledge of two outstanding warrants for the 
unlicensed driver)); United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 587-88 (6th Cir.) 
(holding that '"the use of handcuffs [does not] exceed the bounds of a Terry 
stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that precaution7") (brackets in 
original and citation omitted), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1012 (2004). 
Having discovered the "true facts" in this case— that Lloyd had a gun 
underneath the seat—Officer Powers was entitled to "neutralize the threat of 
harm" by retrieving the handgun. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. He was likewise 
entitled to handcuff Lloyd while he retrieved the weapon, thereby reducing the 
risk he could be blindsided by Lloyd while in a vulnerable position. 
* * * 
In sum, once Lloyd disclosed that he had a gun under his car seat, Officer 
Powers "had only a matter of seconds to assess the situation, formulate a plan of 
action, and implement it." Sanders, 994 F.2d at 207. As he did so, "he had to 
balance several competing priorities: to investigate the alleged crime and make 
any appropriate arrests; to prevent the commission of any additional crimes; not 
to infringe on the rights of [Lloyd or his passengers]; to ensure the safety of 
others of the general population present or nearby; and to go home in one piece 
at the end of his shift." Id. Officer Powers "'h[e]ld the balance t rue/" Gates, ^yL 
U.S. at 241 (citation omitted). 
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C The search of the eyeglass case was within the proper scope of 
the weapons search and, in any event, was justified under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
Finally, Lloyd claims that Officer Powers "further violated [his] 
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures by opening 
[the] small brown glasses case which obviously could not have contained a 
weapon." Aplt. Brf. at 28. This is the sum and substance of his argument. Once 
again, Lloyd has failed to adequately brief his claim and this Court should 
therefore decline to address it. See Sliepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 27. In any 
event, the claim lacks merit. 
It is true that a vehicle search for weapons under Long is not unlimited — it 
must be confined "to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden." 
Long, 463 U.S. 1049. But contrary to Lloyd's claim on appeal, it is not obvious 
that the eyeglass case "could not have contained a weapon." Aplt. Brf. at 28. 
Indeed, the facts of this case prove otherwise, as Officer Powers found two dirty 
syringes inside the case, R.178:13,27. See State v. Hutchins, 164 P.3d 318,322-23 
(Ore. App. 2007) (recognizing that a hypodermic needle could be used as a 
weapon). An eyeglass case could also contain other small weapons, such as a 
small knife, razor blades, or even a small gun. See, e.g., State v. Denk, 758 N.W.2d 
775, 786 (Wise. 2008) (recognizing that eyeglass case was "large enough to 
conceal a small weapon"); Francisco v. Goord, 709 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (N.Y. App. 
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Div. 2000) (upholding determination that inmate violated prison rule 
prohibiting possession of weapons where evidence showed that he received 
from another inmate "an eyeglass case containing a homemade razor blade"); 
Mantei v. State, 1992 WL 12153666 (Ala. App. 1992) (unpublished) (finding that 
eyeglass case was "large enough to contain a conventional weapon such as a 
switchblade knife or a derringer). 
The opening of the eyeglass case was also justified under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement. As discussed, supra, at 12-18, the citizen 
report, combined with the odor of burning narcotic detected by the two officers, 
was more than sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's probable cause 
standard. See State v. Duran, 2005 UT 409, t 22,131 P.3d 246 (recognizing that 
"the smell of burning marijuana provided the officers probable cause that a 
crime was being committed"), ajfd on oilier grounds, 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795. 
Where Lloyd's car was "readily mobile and probable cause exist[ed] to believe it 
contain[ed] contraband, the Fourth Amendment.. . permitted] [Officer Powers] 
to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 
(1996) (per curiam); accord Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67; Despain, 2007 UT App 367, 
HH 13-16. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment below. 
Respectfully submitted September 17, 2010. 
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